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Theory of Mind in 
Chimpanzees: A Rationalist 
Approach 
Benjamin Grant Purzycki 
Abstract: The question of whether or not chimpanzees possess the 
ability to mentally represent others' mental states has been a popular 
question since Premack and Woodruff (1978) originally asked the 
question. It is well established that humans have a theory of mind 
(ToM), but extending this psychological faculty to our evolutionary 
cousins has created a massive amount of literature and research 
attempting to resolve this issue. Such a resolution is arguably not 
possible given the nature of the debate. An Either/Or approach to 
chimpanzee theory of mind both ignores the essential components of 
ToM as well as foreclosing on the possibility that there is variability of 
the iriformational encapsulation at the modular level between closely 
related species. 
The Modular Mind and Naturalism 
In order to discuss ToM, it is imperative to summarize the 
body of scientific advancements, particularly in the realm of cognitive 
science, to understand the theoretical backdrop behind the current 
debate. The most influential production concerning the Modular or 
Computational Theory of Mind comes from Jerry Fodor's classic The 
Modular Mind (Fodor 1983).1 Firstly, the distinction between mind 
and brain is important to make. While the brain, a biological structure, 
is responsible for the bulk of what constitutes an organism's behavior, 
the mind can be divided conceptually into various functions or 
faculties. Fodor thus defines "facuIty psychology" as the "view that 
many fundamentally different kinds of psychological mechanisms must 
be postulated in order to explain the facts of mental life" (Fodor 1983: 
1). In other words, there are a number of innate, cognitive mental 
mechanisms that are responsible for particular functions, or "domain-
specific". 
Domain-specificity is defined by Hirschfeld and Gelman as 
"the idea that all concepts are not equal, and that the structure of 
knowledge is different in important ways across distinct content 
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areas ... [i.e.] cognitive abilities [that] are specialized to handle specific 
types of information" (Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994: 3). Put differently, 
there are a number of different ways of organizing what is perceived, 
and various mental structures are responsible for organizing different 
bodies of information; e.g. language, a template-system of intuitive 
ontology, naive physics, etc. (Boyer 2001; Boyer & Barrett 
Forthcoming; Chomsky 2000; Vosniadou 1994 respectively). This 
essay focuses specifically on mental functions; not the brain as a 
biological structure. 
As for the study of mind, whether human or chimpanzee, 
Chomsky notes that "a 'naturalistic approach' to the mind investigates 
mental aspects of the world as we do any others, seeking to construct 
intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of eventual integration 
with the 'core' natural sciences" (Chomsky 2000). What Chomsky and 
others hope for is an understanding of the domain-specific mechanisms 
of the mind, how they operate, and what they do with specific 
representational information. Summing up the naturalistic program, 
Sperber notes that "Representations, whether mental or public, are 
themselves objects in the world" (2000: 3). Such an approach is 
attempted here, though the difficulties in such an investigation 
concerning chimpanzee cognition should be abundantly clear and 
equally problematic. 
The most conservative of definitions, according to Jerry 
Fodor, claims that there are four distinct characteristics of modularity: 
encapsulation, inaccessibility, domain specificity, and innateness 
(Fodor 1998: 127-128). Encapsulation, or "informational 
encapsulation" is the idea that modules have hardwired information 
within them, which informs perception and that "Information flow 
between modules-and between modules and whatever unmodularized 
systems the mind may contain-is constrained by mental architecture" 
(127). Optical illusions (Fig. 1) provide such an example: regardless 
of what we actually know about the illusion-it remains illusory. 
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The above illustration is deceptive: the center circles are the 
same size, yet the center circle on the left looks considerably larger than 
the center circle on the right. Even though we know they are the same 
size, the illusion is maintained because our cognitive architecture 
demands it. "Inaccessibility" refers to the idea that while incoming 
information cannot alter the state of or the information contained within 
the target module (encapsulation) itself, the target module cannot 
inform outside information-in other words, "it is supposed not to be 
available for the subject's voluntary report" (Ibid). This, however, does 
not exclude the researcher from identifying a modular faculty. 
The question, then, becomes what precisely should be 
considered modular, based on the above-listed qualifications. Many 
have argued that the ToM is a modular characteristic of both our own 
species and chimpanzees. Before returning to this debate, it is 
necessary to examine whether chimpanzees employ a general learning 
mechanism or indeed have "domain-specific" mental organs that 
organize perception and thought. If we can safely assume our own 
minds are organized in such a specific way-are researchers 
susceptible to applying an invalid degree of anthropomorphism to 
chimpanzees when considering their minds? 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) aptly articulate the main 
theoretical difference between behaviorist and nativist approaches to 
the mind. They distinguish between what they call the Standard Social 
Science Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (lCM). The 
SSSM is "The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural 
phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual framework 
for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the 
intellectual justification for their claims of autonomy from the rest of 
science" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992: 23). Because of this century-long 
stagnation of development, "the central concept in psychology [has 
been] learning", rather than innateness (29). In other words, most 
behavior is learned, rather than an expression of genetically endowed 
faculties. And such learning, according to the SSSM, must be 
"equipotential, content-free, content-independent, general-purpose, 
domain-general... these mechanisms [of learning] must be constructed 
in such a way that they can absorb any kind of cultural message or 
environmental input equally well" (29). The ICM, on the other hand, 
attempts to locate specific qualities of the mind, their function(s), and 
under what conditions are they optimal. While Cosmides and Tooby 
argue that such domain-specific mechanisms have been specifically 
selected for evolutionarily, this debate lies outside the scope of this 
paper (for further information on Evolutionary Psychology, see Buss 
2004; Barrett et al. 2002). 
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Theory of Mind: Development in Humans 
Concerning the growth of innate faculties, our own species 
illustrates an interesting trend during development. Gopnik and 
Wellman note that there are three main stages of a child's cognitive 
development with regards to the ToM. At 2 years, a child is equipped 
with "psychological knowledge [that] seems to be structured largely in 
terms of two types of internal states, desires, on the one hand, and 
perceptions, on the other" (Gopnik & Wellman 1994: 265). In other 
words, a landmark achievement in childhood development in an 
understanding of others' mental states such as needs-the 
understanding that "what is in the mind can change what is in the 
world"-and the understanding that "what is in the mind depends on 
what is in the world" (265). 
By 3 years of age, an elaboration of mental activities and 
states occurs. Such concepts of "think, know, remember, make-
believe, dream" are understood as mental activities, while a 5-year-old 
has a fully "representational model of mind". By this time, mental 
states including "beliefs [and false-beliefs], pretences, and images" are 
but a few of the psychological understandings of normally developed 
children. Baron-Cohen' s (1997) groundbreaking essay on "mind-
blindness" of autistic children who have an impaired or lack a ToM 
illustrates that understanding mental states is quite a task for 
individuals afflicted with such disorders. It should be kept in mind, 
then, that if chimpanzees lack a ToM, they would behave in a similar 
manner to autistic individuals, which, as discussed below, is clearly not 
the case. 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were the fIrst to ask whether 
chimpanzees have a ToM. Premack and Woodruff understand the ToM 
as an "individual [that] imputes mental states to himself and to others" 
(515). They argue that "assigning mental states to another individual is 
not a sophisticated or advanced act, but a primitive one" (525). The 
question of whether or not the chimpanzee (or human, for that matter) 
is correct in hislher inference of attributing a mental state to another is 
irrelevant (but interesting)-the question is whether such inferences 
occur. Premack and Woodruff note that 
Only on two occasions are the inferences [of mental states] not found: 
when there is not enough understanding of the scene to permit the 
inference, as in the young, confused child, or when the inference indeed 
occurs, but is quite deliberately suppressed, as by a sophisticated adult 
who, having been taught the differences between data and inference, 
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elects on this occasion to give what he calls an objective 'description' 
(525). 
Byrne and Whiten elaborate: "If an individual is able to respond 
differentially, according to the beliefs and desires of another individual 
(rather than according to the other's overt behaviour), then it possesses 
a theory of mind" (Byrne & Whiten 1997: 8). In sum, then, a behavior 
exhibiting a reaction based on an understanding of another's beliefs and 
desires would be the shadow cast from the substance of a theory of 
mind module or mechanism (ToMM). 
On the other hand, one must be wary when regarding certain 
behaviors as indicators of a ToM. Take, for example, a squirrel that 
takes flight each time a human approaches. While it may be argued 
that the squirrel has a ToM because it has an understanding of the 
human's mental state (e.g. "wanting to eat it"), such a conclusion 
ignores the possibility that the squirrel is reacting to the human and not 
its mental states. Comparing the cognitive capacity of a squirrel with 
that of a chimpanzee is inherently absurd-primarily because of the 
fact that chimpanzees' do indeed display a certain degree of protean 
behavior. Geoffrey Miller argues that this proteanism-the capacity 
for unpredictable behavior-is an evolutionarily sound feature of the 
animal kingdom (Miller 1997). More specifically, individual 
chimpanzees require a degree of unpredictability in order to fool others, 
ergo maximizing fitness. 
While some have argued that "reading minds" is an innate 
faculty of our species and-by extension-chimpanzees, others argue 
that such a trait is wholly learned. For instance, Perner, Ruffinan, and 
Leekam (Perner et al. 1994) argue that "sibling interaction provides a 
rich 'data base' for building a theory of mind" because "children from 
larger families [are] better able than children from smaller families to 
predict" a false-belief in a character of a story narrated to them. The 
main problem with Perner et al. 's thesis is the fact that they confuse 
mast~ry of mind reading with the ability to read minds. In other words, 
if a child is not employing or "exercising" this faculty, they will not be 
as adept at identifying false-beliefs, intentions, etc. to a given agent. It 
should be argued, however, that having more siblings better prepares 
the ToM faculty, rather than actually "bestowing" it upon an individual. 
While Perner et al. contend that their findings create a "serious problem 
for nativist proposals and various developmental explanations relying 
on internal maturation", they deem Fodor's "earlier, less radical 
claims" compatible with their own data (1994). Unfortunately, Perner 
et al. remain unclear regarding the distinction between learned vs. 
developed (what is already there) when they claim that ''the finding that 
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siblings help develop a theory of mind is compatible with the 
sociocognitive tradition [which emphasizes] intellectual progress as a 
function of social interaction among peers and view intellectual growth 
as a process of internalizing the knowledge already incorporated in the 
social interaction" (1994). 
In sum, Perner et al. 's data do not create problems for "nativist 
proposals," if anything they support them, as "poverty of the stimulus" 
arguments contend. Scholl and Leslie (1999) note that "whenever 
modularity exists, it is always a matter of degree."2 Put differently, 
Chomsky argues that "a central part of what we call 'learning' is 
actually better understood as the growth of cognitive structures [which 
are innately endowed] along an internally directed course under the 
triggering and partially shaping effect of the environment" (Chomsky, 
1980: 33. Emphasis added.). If this truly is the case, one may feasibly 
pose the question to Perner et al.: where did only-children "learn" a 
theory of mind? If the answer is from the parents, that would certainly 
not disqualify a single child from "learning" a theory of mind, but 
rather reducing the amount of stimulation. But "poverty of the 
stimulus" arguments contend that the stimulus itself is impoverished (in 
this case, behavior}-a great deal of our thinking is the result of 
inference-making rather than a recording of all behaviors and 
outcomes. What we see is extremely limited-what we intuit is just as, 
if not more, important than the behaviors that stimulate mental activity 
(Fodor 1985). 
Primate/Machiavellian Intelligence 
One scheme of what constitutes a ToM comes from Simon 
Baron-Cohen, who notes that while it "is clear that many monkey 
species and the apes show social intelligence in that they form 
alliances, keep track of social status, and behave tactically in grooming 
those allies they depend on .. .it is not necessarily evidence of the 
possession of a theory of mind" (1999: 14). Baron-Cohen argues that 
there are eight requirements that must be met in order to grant one a 
ToM, namely: a) intentionally communicating with others; b) repairing 
failed communication with others; c) teaching others; d) intentionally 
persuading others; e) intentionally deceiving others,; t) building shared 
plans and goals; g) intentionally sharing a focus or topic of intention; 
and h) pretending (Baron-Cohen 1999). Baron-Cohen unnecessarily 
separates "persuasion" and "deception"; deception is simply a specific 
form of persuasion. In other words, if an individual deceives, he or she 
persuades-deception is successful persuasion of something false. 
Such qualifications are discussed below, resulting in the identification 
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of what may be the only lacking qualification-building shared plans 
and goals. However, all of the above requirements spring from the core 
qualities of a ToM: understanding beliefs, desires, and intentions in 
others. 
At this point, it should be clear that the notion of "general 
intelligence" is not applicable to our own species, as domain-specificity 
proves. However, the question arises as to whether our evolutionary 
cousins Pan troglodytes operate under such modes of "general 
intelligence" or not. If "general intelligence" were applicable, we 
would fmd individual chimpanzees in a single social group behaving in 
the same manner, as they would be exposed to the same stimuli. Put 
differently, general intelligence in this case forecloses on the possibility 
of within-group variability. This, however, turns out not to be the case 
(see Goodall 1990). In addition, Tomasello and Boesch (1998) argue 
that, indeed, chimpanzees are "cultural" beings. If "culture" is "a set of 
processes" rather than "monolithic", chimpanzees exhibit a number of 
varying behaviors that qualify as cultural insofar that they are both 
specific to a certain group and learned behaviors (591). In addition, 
relationships between individual chimpanzees based on rank are clearly 
different across individuals. 
Tomasello arid Boesch note that we can "posit that the 
naturally occurring behaviors of a primate group may be assumed to be 
cultural.. . when (1 ) two groups of the same species differ in a 
behavior ... (2) there are no obvious differences in the environments of 
the two groups ... and (3) there are no genetic differences between 
individuals that acquire the behavior and those that do not" (1998: 592-
593). Such qualifying factors imply that learning is taking place on an 
individual level, rather than a predisposition for certain behaviors 
among all individuals. Tomasello and Boesch note that "ecological 
differences in the environment inhabited by different chimpanzee 
populations may in some cases be a direct explanation for the variations 
we observe between them" (593). While chimpanzees of Mount Nimba 
in West Africa, Gombe, and Tar crack nuts against tree trunks, the 
chimpanzees of Bossou do not because the fruit Strychnos that contains 
the nuts do not grow in the area that the Bossou inhabit (594). On the 
other hand, using a stick for extracting bone marrow from red colobus 
monkeys has only been observed among the Tar, even though all 
species hunt the red colobus (594). 
In sum, it is doubtful that while chimpanzees are endowed 
with an obviously less specialized mind as humans have, their minds 
are not organized in a different manner in terms of domain-specificity. 
While different groups of chimpanzees exhibit different behaviors, this 
does not foreclose on the possibility that chimpanzees are born with 
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minds as a tabula rasa. Further proof of this lies in chimpanzees' 
application of their ability to deceive others in a number of ways. 
Machiavellianism has been defined as "a strategy of social 
conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often 
against the other's self-interest" (Wilson et al. 1996, quoted in Byrne & 
Whiten 1998: 12). If a chimpanzee fools another in order to, for 
example, acquire resources (sexual or nutritional), the "fooling" alone 
does not necessarily suggest a ToM immediately. On the other hand, 
such acts of deception which rely on "whether an individual can 
discriminate another'sfalse beliefwould be the most convincing way to 
demonstrate a true reading of 'mind'" (Whiten 1998: 144). Has this 
been demonstrated? 
Franz de Waal recounts how a chimpanzee Yeroen mildly hurt 
his hand in a fight with another chimp named Nikkie. One observer 
noticed that Yeroen only limped when Nikkie was around. De Waal 
confirmed this when he noticed that once Yeroen was out ofNikkie's 
field of vision, he would walk normally (de Waal 2000: 35). Not only 
does this imply that chimpanzees are aware that "seeing is knowing" 
(see below), but also that an individual chimp wanted another to 
believe he was hurt. This behavior lasted a week, during which 
"Yeroen kept an eye on Nikkie to see whether he was being watched" 
(Ibid). This example fulfills not only the "pretending" qualification of 
possessing a ToM, but the "persuasion" and "deception" components as 
well. The next grouping of criterion falls under the general heading of 
"social" or "shared intentions." 
At this point, Tomasello et al. (2004) argue that ''the crucial 
difference between human cognition and that of other species", namely, 
"the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with 
shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality" (1). What 
immediately comes to mind is the question of chimpanzee collaborative 
hunting, which Tomasello et al. consider: "The most complex 
cooperative activity of chimpanzees is group hunting, in which two or 
more males seem to play different roles in corralling a monkey" (18). 
Tomasello et al. render such cooperation as having no difference from 
hunting carried out by other social mammals (e.g. lions and wolves), 
which operates on impulse and opportunistic frenzies. In addition, 
Tomasello et al. find it "almost unimaginable that two chimpanzees 
might spontaneously do something as simple as carry something 
together or help one another make a tool" (19). In the case discussed 
below, it is clear that chimpanzees-if given the chance-will behave 
in a manner that benefits the agent solely, rather than any cooperative 
behavior that would indicate a shared intention (see Kennedy, this 
volume). 
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However, Tomasello et al. overlook the fact that chimpanzees 
will act cooperatively by forging coalitions to overthrow an alpha male, 
let alone work together to maintain the power of an alpha (see de Waal 
2000: 139-149; Goodall 1990: 98-111). It should be noted that 
coalitions are created at fantastically frequent rates, (ca. 1,000-1,500 
per year in captivity), but the overthrowing of an alpha does not (de 
Waal 2000: 31). If this irrefutable fact of coalition building to 
overthrow an alpha were a result from "observation" (that is, assuming 
chimpanzees are true behaviorists), it would be quite a feat to explain 
coalition forging and alpha-overthrowing in such terms. Individuals 
participating would collectively have to understand that their goal is, 
indeed, to get rid of an existing alpha. If chimpanzees were incapable 
of doing so, all those involved in the overthrow of an alpha would have 
to have already observed not only the removal of an alpha, but also a 
collaborative effort to do so. Moreover, they would have to be able to 
understand the outcome as a result from the collaborative effort if they 
are to repeat the process. Individuals who build coalitions are 
obviously goal-oriented and require assistance from others to achieve 
this goal. This suggests, indeed, that chimpanzees have a ToM. 
However, mundane, everyday behaviors are far better 
indicators for shared intentionality. De Waal, for instance, observes 
that individual chimpanzees will hold branches for others to climb into 
trees guarded by electrical fence. The branches are placed in a manner 
that requires one individual to reinforce the instability of the formation 
while another climbs the branches in order to gather otherwise 
unobtainable leaves (2000: 198-199). Even an adult helping an infant 
out of a tree indicates that there is some degree of sharing by way of 
understanding another's predicament (30). Moreover, the fact that after 
engaging in conflict, chimpanzees will avoid each other until one of the 
combatants expresses a behavior indicative of a truce (e.g. extending a 
hand). Such a "collaborative" avoidance not only indicates mutual 
animosity, but also suggests that each individual involved in a conflict 
"keep in mind" that alleviating the tension has yet to occur. 
Turning to a related question: is seeing believing or indicative 
of understanding another's mental states? More specifically, does joint 
attention imply shared intention? Flombaum and Santos (2005) 
recently published findings that suggest rhesus monkeys are equipped 
with the understanding that a researcher's inability to see a hidden 
grape provides an opportunity to steal it. Povinelli and Eddy (1996a) 
conducted a study to determine whether chimpanzees followed a 
human's gaze. In one case, the human looked at a specific location 
with only his eyes, while in another case the human looked with both 
eyes and head. They found that "subjects looked where the human was 
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looking equally often whether or not the head was moved, 
demonstrating the efficacy of eye direction alone" (Tomasello & Call 
1997: 317). In another experiment (Povinelli & Eddy 1996b), 
researchers stared directly at a Plexiglas wall. The assumption was that 
the chimps would bypass the wall, rather than inspect it, if the line of 
gaze were of particular significance in the chimps' minds. However, 
chimps consistently looked at both sides of the partition-with 
particular emphasis on the side available to the researcher's view-
rather than exhibiting a primary concern with the wall at the end of the 
room. In sum, chimpanzees determined that the Plexiglas wall was of 
the researcher's interest, rather than blindly following his line of 
vision. 
De Waal also reports an occasion when researchers hid a 
number of fruits in an enclosed area. Chimpanzees in an area close saw 
the researchers enter the area-with a box full of fruit-then leave the 
area with an empty box. When the chimps were allowed into the area, 
they searched "madly" without finding any of the fruit: 
A number of apes passed the place where the grapefruits were hidden 
without noticing anything-at least that is what we thought. Dandy 
[the name of one chimp] too had passed over the hiding place where the 
grapefruits were hidden without stopping or slowing down at all and 
without showing any undue interest. That afternoon, however, when all 
the apes were lying dozing in the sun, Dandy stood up and made a bee-
line for the spot. Without hesitation he dug up the grapefruits and 
devoured them at his leisure. If Dandy had not kept the location of the 
place a secret, he would probably have lost the grapefruits to the others 
(1990: 62). 
Even if this were not the first time Dandy behaved with such cunning, 
he still would require an understanding that if he suppressed 
acknowledgement of the fruit, others would not enjoy the bounty. Not 
only was Dandy planning, but also intentionally, and probably 
consciously, deceiving others in order to better himself. 
Elsewhere, Byrne and Whiten (Byrne & Whiten, 1992) review 
the complexity of tactical deception, which they define ''functionally, as 
'acts from the normal repertoire of the agent, deployed such that 
another individual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify, to the 
advantage of the agent"'. Obviously, "Acts of deception involve other 
primates: as objects to be manipulated, as social tools to manipulate 
others, or even sometimes as the resource to be gained". On the other 
hand, it also implies that the deceivers/deceived must be able to both 
retaliate and remember (1992). 
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According to Byrne and Whiten, "the two Pan species and the 
Papio baboons are significantly over-represented in records of 
deception. By contrast, no clear case of deception has yet been 
reported for strepsirhine primates or tarsiers" (1992). The data 
collected by Byrne and Whiten were exclusively anecdotal, which 
opens the procedural doors to many problems. Povinelli and Vonk 
argue that the 
real problem with the anecdotes is not that it is unparsimonious to 
account for chimpanzee deception by appealing to associative learning 
models ... [but] that each anecdote presupposes a behavioral abstraction 
on the basis of which a mental state is inferred, without specifying what 
unique causal work the second-order mental state performs (2003: 
159). 
In other words, anecdotal "evidence" for chimpanzees' mental 
representations inherently relies on the assumption that representations 
of behaviors already occur-something which has yet to be proven, 
according to Povinelli and Vonk. So, for instance, if one were to 
observe a chimpanzee deceiving another into thinking he does not have 
food, the observer is already attributing an understanding of mental 
states to the chimpanzee without testing. The problems with 
experimental procedures that attempt to definitively reveal that chimps 
have an understanding of others' mental states are equally problematic. 
By now, it should be clear that there is no question that 
chimpanzees' have representational or intentional minds. For instance, 
Goodall notes that in the wild, "often an individual prepares a tool for 
use on a termite mound that is several hundred yards away and 
absolutely out of sight", implying that not only do chimpanzees' have 
the capacity to retain a complex amalgam of representations (termite 
hill; need to use tool to collect termites; how to construct tool; how to 
use tool; location of termite hill; "my" location in response to termite 
hill), but also the ability to plan based on said representations (1990: 
22). If chimpanzees were observed to construct such a toolfor another 
chimpanzee, this would add more evidence of a ToM, but would still 
fall under scrutiny that such a behavior was learned. Either way, it 
would suggest that "shared intentions" were evident. 
Discussion 
The arguments made by a number of skeptics regarding the 
chimpanzee's ability to mentally represent others' mental states boil 
down to a few fundamental, yet ultimately unanswerable (arguably) 
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questions. Firstly, until chimpanzees can fully articulate what they 
understand in a comprehensively intelligible way, humans may never 
have defmitive proof that chimps have a ToM. Taken to the extreme, 
Robert M. Gordon argues that "one familiar with the recent literature 
ought to conclude that there is still no convincing evidence of theory of 
mind in human primates" (Gordon 1998: 120). If the ToM is defined 
as "the anticipation, explanation, and social coordination of behavior", 
Gordon reasons, we certainly cannot attribute a ToM to our own 
species because "a very important part of our social behavior-our 
emotional responses to ephemeral shifts in another's vocal and facial 
expression-seems chiefly to rely on fast processing that does not 
await causal analysis" (121). 
Put differently, individuals react to such subtle behaviors 
(which they may not even be conscious of) that an understanding of 
another'S mental states is not necessary. Gordon fails to understand 
precisely what he is doing: namely, by assuming that supporters of 
ToM do not understand or have not read (a mental activity) the "recent 
literature," he is surely granting them a mental state, however 
impoverished Gordon thinks they may be. In sum, attributing mental 
states to an individual that is not present may very well be the best 
proof of a ToM in our species. Such philosophical hair-splitting 
revolves around-yet argues against Cartesian understandings of the 
mind and its operations (Descartes 1998: 35-39). Mental activities such 
as thought prove existence-yet thinking about external stimulation is 
actually meditating on the representation of the said stimulation (127). 
Descartes notes that making "the inference 'I am walking, therefore I 
exist'" is not a plausible conclusion "except in so far as the awareness 
of walking is a thought" (Ibid). The question of modularity in this case, 
however, is less clear. 
Descartes interestingly observed that 
if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just 
happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men 
themselves ... Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could 
conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something 
which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by 
the faculty of judgment which is in my mind (Descartes 1998: 85). 
In sum, we do not look at others without granting them 
agency. In terms of modularity, this ability fits under Fodor's original 
qualifications. While Descartes was incorrect insofar as he understood 
an agent as an intellectual exercise, rather than an innate faculty, he 
certainly described ToM aptly. Gopnik creates a first-person narrative 
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describing the world according to an autist. People sitting around the 
individual are described as "bags of skin [that] are draped over chairs, 
and stuffed into pieces of cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected 
ways" (1993; quoted in Baron-Cohen 1997: 4-5). Are we to believe, 
then, that chimpanzees truly look at the world-especially their fellow 
chimps-in this manner? 
We grant agency without necessarily being aware of it. In 
other words, we do not look at others and acknowledge the fact that we 
are seeing more than "hats and coats which could conceal automatons". 
The information that is encapsulated is the attribution of agency, and 
arguably with experience, this attribution is elaborated and specified: 
in the case of our own species, attributing mental states as "dreaming" 
and "making-believe" are not innate, but elaborations or outgrowths of 
attributing agency. In the case of chimpanzees, ToM is less specific or 
sophisticated-rather than completely absent. The question, then, turns 
itself inward: are we simply anthropomorphizing chimpanzees because 
of our own innate faculties? 
Anthropomorphizing has been included in Brown's human 
universals,. a characteristic that is demonstrated around the world by all 
peoples (Brown 1991: 139). While Brown notes that this trait is 
generally found in religious contexts, anthropomorphizing occurs in 
other contexts as well. One common view of anthropomorphism is the 
notion that our species animates certain entities (e.g. God, ghosts, 
chimpanzees, etc.) in order to understand them better and to mitigate 
fears surrounding them. Pascal Boyer argues that firstly, "gods and 
spirits are not represented as having human features in general but as 
having minds, which is much more specific" and secondly, ''the 
concept of a mind is not exclusively human," meaning we attribute 
agency to all entities rendered intentional (Boyer 2001: 144). In other 
words, we intuitively (i.e. naturally) attribute a will and desires to 
animate entities-this is the crux of anthropomorphism (Ibid). Are 
primate psychologists guilty of inappropriately attributing "a mind" to 
chimpanzees in this case? 
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) tend to think so by suggesting that 
the chimpanzee mind seems so much like our own because "the human 
mind may have evolved a unique mental system that cannot help 
distorting the chimpanzee's mind, obligatorily recreating it in its own 
image" (2003: 157). Like religious ideas, we may be projecting our 
own qualities on chimpanzees by granting them a ToM by our intuitive 
inference making. But if in fact chimpanzees do have such an 
understanding of others' mental states, and we agree that they do, we 
would still be anthropomorphizing-we would simply be accurate in 
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our inference-making. This attribution of other minds, on the other 
hand, creates a problem for such hair-splitters such as Gordon. 
Gordon's question also relates to what Chomsky and others 
call "Descartes' problem", namely ''the emphasis on the creative aspect 
of language use and on the fundamental distinction between human 
language and the purely functional and stimulus-bound animal 
communication systems, rather than the Cartesian attempts to account 
for human abilities" (Chomsky 2002: 55). While Chomsky is 
specifically discussing the "creative aspect of human language", the 
same argument may be applied, as Gordon has, with respect to 
chimpanzee ToM. Firstly, if all of these "subtleties" that Gordon refers 
to are actually the sum-total of the stimuli, and behaviors that are a 
response to the processing of that sum-total, this still does not deny the 
possibility of a ToMM because such a module requires stimulation for 
engagement Gust like the optical illusion example provided above). 
Secondly, such arguments foreclose on the possibility of a "creative 
aspect" of chimpanzee behavior. The point is, Gordon is taking a 
purely behaviorist approach to the ToM-mostly a mental activity. 
In addition, what Gordon does not acknowledge, but alludes to 
(perhaps not consciously) is what Chomsky calls "Plato's problem": 
"How is it possible that we have the knowledge that we do have? What 
is the knowledge that we do have and on what basis could we possibly 
have acquired it?" (Chomsky 2004: 207; 1980: 180). A behaviorist 
such as Gordon assumes such knowledge is learned and behaviors are 
reacted to based on either previous experience or processing a number 
of subtle gestures that "do not await causal analysis". If such a suite of 
subtleties do not "await causal analysis", then such subtleties are 
arguably purely instinctual, rather than a choice on the part of an agent. 
This fits nicely with Fodor's definition of modularity, but denies the 
ability of researchers to explain such behaviors. In sum, then, ToM 
cannot be ultimately "proven" behaviorally or "behavioralistically". 
For instance, Povinelli and Vonk (2003) note that "those who 
believe that deceptive chimpanzees possess a theory of mind must 
postulate two things: first, that they possess behavioral abstractions, 
and second, that they possess representations of mental states" (158). 
They argue that for the entire body of data produced by chimpanzee 
observation to be of any explanatory value, only "behavioral 
abstractions will suffice". (2003: 159) Similar observations made by 
Scott (2001) divide the approaches into those who attribute ToM to 
chimpanzees and those who simply learn "from past experiences", in 
other words a representational memory of behavior, rather than a 
representational understanding of others' representations. 
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Many have called such representations "metarepresentations" 
(see Sperber 2000). Andrew Whiten (2000) discerns between two 
types of met are presentations. Sense (1) is "A mental representation of 
a mental representation." An example ofthis is (in the mind of you, the 
reader) "John believes in ghosts". You understand that John's belief in 
ghosts is a mental activity-so John's representation is now yours, so 
to speak. Sense (2) is "A mental representation of a mental 
representation as a representation (2000: 140). So, your understanding 
that John's belief in ghosts is a representation is a representation. 
Does this occur in chimpanzees? 
The Premacks (1983: 57-67; 2003: 145-157) conducted a 
study in which the chimpanzees were shown videotaped images of 
actors attempting to solve a number of problems. In the fIrst test, an 
actor attempted to reach inaccessible bananas (hanging overhead, lay 
outside a cage, blocked by a large box). In another number of tests, 
actors were confronted with "malfunctioning equipment: a 
disconnected hose, a phonograph whose cord was unplugged, a gas 
heater that was unlit", etc (2003: 146). After viewing the videos, Sarah 
(the Premacks' test subject) was given an envelope with photos of the 
solution and solutions to other problems. Initially, Sarah chose the 
correct solution to 18 out of20 problems. The Premack's note that her 
mistakes were likely due to "her ignorance of the difference between 
chimpanzee and human strength" (she "assumed" that a human could 
push a brick-fIlled box aside, rather than empty it) and "an unclear 
photo" (146). Children, on the other hand, who were presented with 
this task failed 50 percent of the time. Even after altering the study to 
accommodate children's' "suburban lifestyles" (e.g. cookies out of 
reach on top of a refrigerator), they continued to fail at the same rate. 
The Premacks argue that the difference lies between the ability 
of chimps to identify, i.e. mentally represent, a "problem" rather than a 
simple sequence of events on a video. The chimps had to attribute a 
goal on the part of the actors presented in the fIlm, whereas three-and-
a-half year old children failed at a larger rate due to their failure to 
attribute a goal to the actors. It would be highly informative to give the 
same tests to older children, as their ToM is mostly fully functional (see 
above). Can one still maintain the stance that Sarah may have 
"learned" this ability---especially after being confronted with a novel 
test? Sarah represented not only the problem identifIed by the actors 
and the problem itself (Sense 1), but recognized it as a problem (Sense 
2). 
The following provides the logic employed by Either/Or 
approaches to understanding ToM in a behavioral context. Considering 
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much of the debates revolve around "learned" behaviors versus "innate 
ideas", the equations are divided as such: 
Behaviorist 
a) Initial behavior + Representation of behavior & outcome 
(successful)7 Repeated behavior 
b) Initial behavior + Representation of situation7 Repeated behavior 
Nativist (Either/Or) 
c) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Initial Behavior7 a) 
and/or b) 
d) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New 
(similar) situation7 ToM module7 Representation engaging 
module7 Behavior Y 
e) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New 
(different) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging 
module7 Behavior Y 
t) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New 
(similar) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 
Behavior X 
g) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New 
(different) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging 
module7 Behavior X 
All "learned theories" of mind assume that the behavior, rather than the 
intentions or mental states of another individual are represented in the 
mind. While a) grants the subject agency, or a choice, b) would rely on 
the notion that the repeated behavior is more instinctual or automatic, 
rather than premeditated. However, the logic of "innateness" 
arguments do not necessarily foreclose on the possibility of 
premeditation although most who argue for modularity of the ToM 
support the notion of premeditated deceptive behaviors. 
Both d) and e) rely on the assumption that "Descartes' 
problem" (in the Chomskyan sense) is answered-new behaviors will 
apply to either new situations that are similar enough to previous 
experience (thus maintaining one step ahead of the deceived, for 
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example) (d) or a completely novel experience (e). The logic employed 
in f) and g) do not demand that a subject displays a new behavior each 
time a novel situation occurs, but f) relies on either the new situation 
involving a different individual and the same interpretation of the 
situation. If, however, the individual who is deceived, for example, is 
the same individual in the previous experience-the deceived is either 
not equipped with the ability to "figure things out" (Le. too dumb to 
learn) or simply that the deceiver's behavior is relatively new. 
Looking at a) and b), the question begs: when did behavior 
originate? At some point, the behavior must have been an act of 
creativity (overcoming an obstacle) and either must be learned and 
remembered continuously throughout generations (thus lowering the 
amount of creativity in chimpanzees) or spontaneously occurs 
throughout chimpanzee populations more often, rather than a behavior 
lineage of some sort (thus heightening the creative abilities in chimps). 
The former relies on the assumption that chimpanzees have less of a 
capacity for creative tactical deception or protean behavior. What must 
be understood, however, is the fact that if this were the case, a 
chimpanzee would require the ability to understand the difference 
between a deceptive tactic and a behavior that accidentally may have 
been deceptive.3 
If Chimp X learned a deceptive tactic from Chimp Y, not only 
the behavior and the outcome have been committed to memory 
(representations), but the motive or appropriateness of behavior must 
be understood as well. This indicates that chimpanzees do indeed 
possess an understanding of others' mental states based on the 
requirement of understanding the concomitant basic point of a 
deceptive behavior. In sum, chimpanzees would have to be able to 
understand the rationale of a deceptive tactic as well as the ability not 
to be fooled in order to learn from another chimpanzee. 
In a naturalistic setting, there is no a priori reason to foreclose 
on the possibility that even scientists cannot be fooled by such a 
potentially subtle behavior. The fact that such surprising finds have 
been so recent in the realm of primatology only reinforces this. If we 
are susceptible to projecting our own anthropomorphizing minds onto 
others, we certainly may not account for certain subtleties. Some data 
collection methods simply are not capable of keeping such a close 
watch on a number of individuals (Altmann 1970). Problematically, 
however, experimental settings are susceptible-and frequently under 
scrutiny from-to the skeptical argument that the chimpanzees were 
taught a focal behavior. 
However, should we think of the ToM in an Either/Or 
manner? If we discount the prescribed "collaborative intentionality", 
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chimpanzees, it would seem, have the capacity to read other's minds-
but with a limited number of abstraction-level mental state categories. 
The category which they fail to fulfill is likely concomitant to more 
complexly social animals-i.e. humans. If ToM is modular, 
"collaborative intentionality" should not necessarily be a condition-
such an extra or more complex system of social cognition is likely 
equipped with another cognitive mechanism at work-rather than more 
encapsulated information. In other words, chimp ToM is likely only 
equipped with the mental abstractions of "seeing" and "desiring", with 
an emphasis on how to properly exploit others in order to benefit one's 
self (egocentric) whereas human ToM can be employed to 
accommodate collaborative intentionality-arguably made possible 
only by another psychological mechanism. 
Returning to Baron-Cohen's explication of "mind-blindness", 
we find what he calls the "Autism Spectrum" (2003). At the extreme 
end of this spectrum, we find low-functioning autists who are unable to 
perform false-belief ToM related tasks that individuals with Down's 
syndrome can perform (1997: 71). Baron-Cohen briefly discusses the 
difference between high-functioning autists and those who have 
Asperger's syndrome (AS) who have difficulty in picking up on social 
cues: "Compared with someone of the same age and IQ level without 
autism, all people with autism or AS are seen as socially odd, odd in 
their communication, and unusually obsessional, to varying degrees" 
(2003: 136). If there is, then, an Autism Spectrum, is there not 
conversely and ToM spectrum? 
What a "degree" model would throw into question is how 
developed our own ToM truly is in terms of informational 
encapsulation. Intuitively, it is probably not so much the case that 
"dreaming" is an innate concept, but such innate mental abstractions 
such as "knowing" or "believing" are likely evolutionarily sound 
mechanisms to have. It is also more likely that such initial 
characteristics of human ToM are not much different from a chimp's-
we simply obtain more stimulus, both quantitative and qualitative, 
which would expand our understandings of others' mental states. In 
sum, then, a ToM spectrum should stimulate the question that there 
may be some variability in the information encapsulated within our 
modules. In addition, it opens yet another question: is there variability 
in translation from essential information to behavior? Put differently, if 
our ToMM contains the same essential elements that a chimp's does, 
why is there a cognitive limitation on how it is used? Is it simply a 
matter of language? 
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Conclusion 
It seems that the debates need not be black or white in the case 
of ToM. Specifically, why should we confine ToM as an "Either/Or" 
debate rather than a matter of "degree"? From an evolutionary 
standpoint, it is possible that at the level of mental abstractions, 
chimpanzees simply did not require an elaboration of the basic aspects 
of ToM found in 2-year-old (desires and perceptions) and 3-year-old 
(remember) humans. Along the same lines, the chimpanzees' 
understanding of others' mental states may simply be regarded as less 
developed or more restricted than humans'. However, until we have a 
better understanding of how our own minds work, the debate will likely 
not see a conclusion any time soon, and nor should it. Bridging the 
chasm between our distant cousins and ourselves will be no simple 
task, but nevertheless a worthy one. 
Footnotes 
1 While the term "module" and its applicability continues to rouse 
much debate (one such example is found in Fodor 2000; Pinker 
Forthcoming; Sperber 2002), it should be clear that employing this 
terminology is unavoidable given the nature of the debate discussed 
below. In addition, see the difference between "diachronic" and 
"synchronic" modularity as discussed in Scholl and Leslie (1999). 
2 Here, Scholl and Leslie are suggesting longitudinal variability. 
Below, I question cross-species variability of the same or similar 
mechanism(s) at a fully-functional degree. 
3 In an engaging article, Kristin Andrews (2005) argues that the 
experiments that researchers employ--particularly Povinelli and 
Vonk-actually operate with the tacit assumption that a human child's 
mind is not equipped with a ToM. Povinelli and Vonk operate 
similarly to the above-mentioned logic. 
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